In its second quarter–the first with the Pre in its lineup–Sprint (S) lost 991,000 postpaid subscribers. And in its third, reported yesterday, its lost 801,000. So subscriber loss, while unquestionably gruesome, is diminishing.

How much of this is due to Palm’s (PALM) Pre? Not that much, says CL King & Associates analyst Lawrence Harris, who believes the Pre had only a moderate impact on Sprint’s postpaid subscriber base.

“Within postpaid, the number of CDMA-only subscriber losses was about 100,000 in the September quarter, compared to the 200,000 in the June quarter,” Harris wrote in a research note to clients. “At Sprint, the Palm Pre is a CDMA-only postpaid device. The number of Sprint postpaid subscribers upgrading their handsets was slightly higher in the September quarter than in the June quarter at just over 2.0 million.”

According to Harris, “This number provides some indication of the available market for all high-end devices at Sprint. In Palm’s August quarter, 85% of the company’s sales went to Sprint. Given the absence of growth in Sprint’s CDMA postpaid category, it appears likely that most of the Palm Pre sales went to existing Sprint subscribers as opposed to winning customers from other carriers.”

That would seem to be the case. Sprint rivals AT&T (T) and Verizon Wireless (VZ) each added subscribers during the second quarter–1.4 million and 1.1 million, respectively. So if the Pre did anything for Sprint, it helped to stem CDMA postpaid losses a bit.

And that’s something, right? After all, there’s no panacea for Sprint’s affliction–well, perhaps there is, but it’s locked up in an exclusivity agreement with AT&T (T). Still, when Sprint last reported earnings, CEO Dan Hesse said the carrier expected to sign up more new customers as the Pre gained wider distribution through retail outlets like Best Buy (BBY) and RadioShack. And that doesn’t really seemed to have happened. Perhaps next quarter after Sprint launches the Pre’s not-quite-cheaper sibling, the Pixi.

UPDATE: A quick addendum. In a research note this morning, Bernstein Research analyst Craig Moffett notes that while Sprint has reduced subscriber losses a bit, the cost of doing so has been worrisomely high.

“Yes, net subscriber losses were better,” Moffet explains. “But the cost was very high. Post-paid equipment subsidies soared to $139 per subsidized subscriber in Q3 (up 39 percent from last year), as the company recovered just 36 percent of their equipment costs….Yesterday’s results illustrate why it may not be possible for Sprint to have its cake and eat it too. After all the drastic cost cutting, after all the efforts to refresh the product line, after all the price cuts and new pricing plans, Sprint was able to manage only a modest improvement. Not growth, just a slightly slower rate of decline. And that Herculean effort almost broke the bank. The huge costs of even marginally improving gross additions (and the rate of net subscriber loss) crushed margins.”

Now, that figure includes sales made abroad, so we don’t yet know how many were sold by AT&T (T), but it’s clear that the number was substantial. In its third quarter last year, AT&T activated 2.4 million iPhones and 40 percent of those were for subscribers who switched from other carriers. So the fact that Apple (AAPL) sold as many iPhones as it did in the company’s most recent quarter, bodes well for the carrier.

As Craig Moffett over at Bernstein Research notes, “It is entirely conceivable that AT&T’s iPhone alone will account for more than 100 percent of the entire industry’s post-paid subscriber growth in the third quarter.”

But therein lies the rub. For while sales of Apple’s handset remain strong, the heavy subsidies it requires have pushed AT&T’s wireless margins down. And the heavy data traffic associated with the handset have led to widespread complaints about AT&T’s network, forcing infrastructure upgrades. Worse, AT&T’s dependence on iPhone exclusivity at a time when Apple is clearly transitioning away from such a model leaves it quite vulnerable.

“While the strong sales of the iPhone are positive for AT&T in the near term, they increase the company’s reliance on a product for which we do not believe it will be able to maintain exclusivity,” Pali Research analyst Walter Piecyk wrote in a note to clients Tuesday. “We believe more than one third of AT&T’s post paid customer base is tied to an iPhone user and that mix is likely to rise significantly over the next few quarters.”

But not this quarter. This quarter, AT&T is expected to add 1.5 million to 1.7 million net wireless customers, driven by demand for the iPhone 3GS, which was released early on in the quarter. And while another drop in wireline customers is likely to weigh on results, it will be tempered once again by the iPhone. AT&T is expected to earn 50 cents a share, compared to 55 cents in the year-earlier third quarter, according to analysts polled by Thomson Reuters, who see revenue falling to $30.9 billion from $31.3 billion.

In a research note issued this morning, Huberty–noting that the iPhone’s market share grew 136 percent in France when Apple switched to multicarrier agreements there–said iPhone sales could more than double if the company took a similar tack in other countries.

“We expect Apple to broaden iPhone carrier distribution over the next two years and believe this opportunity is under-appreciated by the investment community,” she wrote. “This total opportunity is substantial–it adds up to an incremental 20.3M iPhone units and $3.76 in adjusted EPS, 100 percent and 41 percent of iPhone units and adjusted EPS respectively.”

Adding further details to her projections, Huberty continues: “In the top six iPhone markets that are still exclusive, we believe that Apple’s market share could rise to 10 percent, on average, in a multiple carrier distribution model from 4 percent today. These six markets represented almost 70 percent percent of iPhone shipments in C2Q09.”

Huberty also claims that if Apple (AAPL) were to end its exclusivity deal with AT&T (T) and add Verizon (VZ) as a second carrier, its share of the U.S. market would more than double, rising to 12.2 percent from 4.9 percent today.

Huberty, it should be noted, isn’t the first analyst to make such a claim. In June, Bernstein Research analyst Toni Sacconaghi said that a deal with Verizon could more than double U.S. iPhone sales in the near term. Said Sacconaghi: “Verizon’s postpaid subscriber base is not only larger than AT&T’s, but more importantly, is untapped whereas we estimate more than 10 percent of AT&T’s postpaid users already have an iPhone.”

That’s what ngmoco co-founder and Electronic Arts (ERTS) alum Neil Young said of Apple’s iconic handset at the Game Developers Conference in San Francisco earlier this year, and it’s worth reflecting on a bit in light of a new report from Bernstein Research analyst Toni Sacconaghi that claims the iPhone OS will soon create pricing and customer migration pressure for traditional gaming platforms.

Noting that some 665-760 million games may have been downloaded from the Apple (AAPL) App Store during the last 12 months, Sacconaghi estimates that the installed base for the iPhone and iPod touch platform could amount to about one third of the total handheld gaming installed base by 2012.

“We believe that gaming embodies the power of Apple’s App store: it has dramatically lowered the entry barriers for both developers and gamers alike, resulting in an unparalleled number of available games at affordable prices, which is creating lock-in and enhanced interest in Apple’s high-margin iPhone (and iPod Touch) platforms,” Sacconaghi writes.

Continuing, the analyst adds: “By most measures, gaming has been the killer App Store category, accounting for an estimated 40% of all downloads. Most importantly, we believe that gaming is providing yet another incremental, differentiated reason for consumers to purchase iPhones and iPod Touches, and creates powerful lock-in to the App Store platform and Apple products on a go forward basis.”

The upshot of all this is bad news for traditional gaming console developers–particularly those who have dismissed it as a novelty. “Most gaming developers today view the iPhone and other smart phones as an incremental opportunity, which targets the casual gamer but not the dedicating gaming enthusiast,” Sacconaghi explains. “Over time, however, we believe that the combination of evolutionary improvements in iPhone/iPod gaming functionality, the convenience of the App Store download model, the App’s Store leading title selection and lower price points could cause some migration among gaming enthusiasts to the Apple platform and/or pressure traditional gaming incumbents’ hardware and software pricing.”

And this is clearly what Apple (AAPL) is aiming for. Consider these recent remarks from Phil Schiller, the company’s senior vice president of worldwide product marketing: “People are starting to see what a great gaming device this is. When you think about the companies that came before us…when you played those other systems, they seemed so cool, but now when you look at them, they don’t stack up against the iPod touch….No Multi-Touch user experience, Games are expensive, No App Store, No iPod, Expensive Games ($25-$40) and uncomfortable retail buying experience. [There are] 607 games for PSP and 3,680 games for Nintendo DS. [But there are ] 21,178 Game and Entertainment Titles at App Store.”

In a research note issued this morning, Bernstein analyst Toni Sacconaghi wondered whether Oracle (ORCL) might even consider walking away from the deal, though he ultimately concluded that it was unlikely.

“Given ORCL’s repeated and strident commentary, it appears very unlikely that it will walk away from the deal, although it would not face a break-up fee if it did (unlike Sun, which faces a $260+ million break-up fee),” he wrote. “We continue to believe that the JAVA-ORCL deal is very likely to close, but it will be interesting to see if Oracle’s conviction level waivers at all on its earnings call today.”

Indeed. Certainly, there are plenty of reasons to think that it might. For one thing, notes Sacconaghi, Sun’s (JAVA) recent financials are going to make it difficult for for Oracle to hit its promised $1.5 billion in first-year accretion profits.

“Our forecast now calls for [Sun] to be barely break even on a non-GAAP basis next year,” Sacconaghi says, adding that earnings are likely to be nearly $900 million less than he modeled when the deal was first announced. “Accordingly, assuming no material revenue synergies, our analysis suggests that in order to hit its $1.5B accretion target, Oracle may need to reduce Sun’s workforce by 15,000, which represents over 50 percent of Sun’s current headcount and appears implausible.”

So Oracle could hit its aggressive Year One accretion targets. It would just have to gut Sun to do it.

One last point worth noting here. Sacconaghi seems confident the European Union will ultimately approve Oracle’s acquisition of Sun, though possibly with conditions around mySQL. But he thinks approval will take time. And the longer it takes, the worse it will be for Sun, whose business is already suffering from the uncertainty surrounding it.

“…The EU took an average of 140 days between the time that a Phase II [review] was announced and a merger was ultimately approved,” he explains. “Given that Phase II for the JAVA deal was announced on September 3rd, this implies a January date for resolution, and would require JAVA to go through another two full quarters as a standalone company. With uncertainty around the ORCL deal already weighing on JAVA, this suggests the potential for further erosion in Sun’s financials.”

“Speculation is rife that Apple will end its exclusive U.S. iPhone service deal with AT&T when the current contract expires in June 2010 and begin to offer phones that work with the Verizon network,” iSuppli analyst Francis Sideco said in a research note today. “However, iSuppli doesn’t believe this will be the case. The main reason Apple is likely to stick with AT&T beyond 2010 is the relatively wide usage and growth expected for the HSPA air standard used by the carrier for 3G data.”

As Sideco explains, “Cumulative global subscribers of HSPA wireless services, consisting of High-Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) and High-Speed Uplink Packet Access (HSUPA), are set to rise to 1.4 billion in 2012, up from 269.1 million in 2009. In contrast, cumulative subscribers for the EVDO standard used by Verizon will amount to 304.6 million in 2013, up from 145.2 million in 2009.”

A point worth noting, though it’s hard to imagine that Apple (AAPL) doesn’t harbor some resentment toward AT&T (T), which has undermined its carefully crafted iPhone experience. And if that’s the case, wouldn’t it make more sense for the company to extend its deal with AT&T, but not as an exclusive? That would allow Apple to hammer out a second deal with Verizon (VZ), which, according to some analysts, would more than double U.S. iPhone sales in the near term.

As Bernstein Research analyst Toni Sacconaghi noted this summer, “Verizon’s postpaid subscriber base is not only larger than AT&T’s, but more importantly, is untapped whereas we estimate more than 10 percent of AT&T’s postpaid users already have an iPhone.”

Bernstein Research analyst Toni Sacconaghi estimates that Apple (AAPL), though it is only the fifth-largest handset vendor, claimed nearly a third of handset industry profits in the first half of 2009 (see table below; click to enlarge).

“Our analysis indicates that Apple’s iPhone accounted for only 8% of handset industry revenues but 32% of industry operating profits in 1H09,” Sacconaghi wrote in a note to clients today. “Even if we exclude the operating losses generated by Motorola and Sony Ericsson, Apple still accounted for 25% of industry profits. iPhone’s success is akin to Apple’s position in the PC industry–where the company enjoys an estimated 25% of industry profits, despite capturing only 6% of industry revenues.”

Quite an achievement considering that the iPhone is just two years old. How did Apple manage it? According to Sacconaghi, Apple succeeded by claiming a first-mover advantage in an expanding high-end market.

“With the iPhone and its Apps Store, Apple has established a formidable smartphone ecosystem, which history suggests is very difficult to overcome,” the analyst explains. “In fact, Apple has the potential to become a de-facto standard of sorts in the consumer smartphone market, much like it became in the portable media player market with iPods, due in large part to its first mover advantage and tight software and hardware integration.

“We believe that over time,” Sacconaghi continues, “single function standalone handheld devices (portable music players, digital cameras, navigation systems, etc.) will become increasingly converged. Apple’s estimated installed base of 75+ million individual iPod and iTunes users provides customers with a seamless migration path to a fuller featured, higher-end integrated device.”

Though Sacconaghi believes Apple should be able to grow faster than the overall handset market without materially lowering prices, he suggests a lower price point might give a signifigant bump to its iPhone business. “We believe Apple will ultimately need to lower price (and margins over time) to expand its addressable market opportunity, including offering a lower-cost, non-data plan iPhone,” he concludes.

Seems the Street would have much preferred the “boatloads of money” Yahoo CEO Carol Bartz once said she’d demand for a search deal, than the “boatloads of value” she claims to have given them this morning. As I write this, Yahoo (YHOO) shares are trading down more than 12 percent at $15.14. Microsoft (MSFT) shares are up 1.41 percent at $23.80.

Below, a roundup of analyst notes that have been issued on the deal.

Jeff Lindsay, Bernstein Research: We believe Yahoo!’s search deal represents a significant positive for the company’s economics, as both Yahoo! and MSFT were too subscale to compete effectively versus Google. Although the combined 30% search share is still less than half the size of Google, both Yahoo! and MSFT will realize significant cost savings from combining their search technologies. In addition, the greater scale should increase the effectiveness of the search engine, driving revenue synergies through improved search monetization.

Sarah Friar, Goldman Sachs: We view the deal as positive for Microsoft as terms are better for the company than had been speculated (no upfront fee; 88% TAC) and the combined market share provides scale to drive efficiency and legitimacy/relevancy for Microsoft’s online investments. Yahoo!’s $3.0 bn/year search sales translates to $360 mn/year for Microsoft in revenues. Microsoft will incur incremental expenses when the deal closes (expected early CY10), but limited (if any) impact on FY10E and while investments will continue into FY11, our model already assumes sizable expenses.

Douglas Anmuth, Barclays: YHOO-MSFT terms not nearly as favorable as anticipated, but we believe deal is neutral to the co’s L-T positioning. We would have liked to have seen an upfront payment, higher TAC, & rev share on Bing.com searches among other things, but we like that YHOO maintains ability to sell search adv, & therefore relationship with its largest advertisers. It’s unclear how favorable the deal will be to YHOO over time, but our fundamental reasons for owning shares remain the same. We expect better execution on the audience & content biz & specifically within display adv., & we believe YHOO will be able to take out a meaningful amount of costs from the biz aside from search tech. over the next couple yrs.

Peter Misek, Cannacord Adams: We are relieved that Microsoft did not have to provide an upfront payment as part of this deal while effectively garnering more scale. This deal provides Microsoft with a much needed boost in competing with Google (GOOG : NASDAQ : US$435.00 | BUY) as its search algorithm, Bing, is being catapulted to greater market share. In addition, utilizing Yahoo!’s sales force for premium search will allow Microsoft to lower expenses over the duration of the partnership while attempting to attract a greater level of advertisers for the combined platforms. We believe this is a much needed relief for Microsoft, but is one step in a greater battle. In the end this doesn not solve Microsoft’s competitive disadvantage with Google. Rather we think it accelerates Microsoft’s desire to think outside the box and come up with a non-linear way to catch Google.

Heath Terry and Andrew Thomas, FBR Capital Markets: The lack of an up-front payment, no minimum revenue guarantee, and a revenue share that, while above average, is slightly below the +90% that larger deals command make for a lackluster deal for Yahoo!, in our opinion. The lack of any display component to the deal also seems like a missed opportunity for the company. As we see it, the only financial benefit to Yahoo! is the ability to shed the not insignificant technology costs associated with running a search engine. According to the company, this should result in an annual benefit to GAAP operating income of $500M….Restructuring these two businesses and untangling them from their existing partnerships and internal ties will be a massive organizational challenge for both companies.

Mark Mahaney, Citi Investment Research: Implications For YHOO – Positives: 1) YHOO believes deal would generate incremental $250MM in annual cash flow (17% accretive to our ’09 est)–assumptions very hard to test, but magnitude is reasonably conservative; 2) 88% TAC is higher than industry average, but as expected given deal size. Challenges: 1) No upfront payment to YHOO is a negative vs. expectations, tho guaranteed RPS provides significant backstop; 2) Lack of display advertising deal is a negative vs. expectations; & 3) Acknowledgment of YHOO’s Search technology limitations.

Todd Greenwald, Signal Hill Capital Group: The deal announced today will take a very long time to come to fruition we think, and will face several challenges–it will face regulatory hurdles given Microsoft’s antitrust history (though we’d expect it to ultimately get through given Google’s dominance). Additionally, it seems hard to fathom operationally, as it will require Yahoo’s salespeople to be selling Microsoft’s technology. Advertisers will want one point of contact (which would be Yahoo), though that point of contact won’t be entirely responsible for what they are selling–instead of bringing in an engineer from within the same building, the Yahoo salesperson may have to coordinate with a Microsoft employee up in Redmond. Not impossible, just tricky. And considering how smooth and automated the process of buying ads is on Google’s platform, this could prove to be a competitive disadvantage.

Mark May, Needham & Company: Search advertising is not a zero sum game, in our opinion. If Microsoft is able to make Yahoo! (and Microsoft) search more effective through this deal/combination, then we believe is will result in advertising spending more on the new search platform but not less on the Google platform. A more effect Yahoo!/Microsoft search platform does not mean Google search becomes less effective, and we believe there is more demand than supply for effective search marketing. The dollars will likely come from other, less effective, buckets.

Business 101 convincingly argues that most large M&A deals and partnerships are not successful. And, most large-scale Internet media M&A deals and partnerships have tended to under-perform their original promise (e.g., AOL Time Warner, Google/MySpace, etc.). Moreover, in the case of Yahoo!/Microsoft Search, you have two very different cultures and an expected 24 month transition process. The odds are stacked against this deal having a meaningfully impact on Google. And, over the next 2+ years while Yahoo! and Microsoft are trying to transition, Google will be innovating.

Sacconaghi believes that Dell (DELL) isn’t interested in a “transformational” acquisition, though its interest in the handset market might suggest otherwise. Rather, the company is mulling the acquisition of small- to medium-sized enterprise-related companies.

“While there has been speculation that Dell could look to acquire a handset company and we continue to believe that a consolidation play in the PC space could make sense for additional details, Dell appears focused on boosting its enterprise business by acquiring small to medium sized companies with strong margin profiles and higher levels of recurring revenues,” Sacconaghi writes.

Which companies? Software, services or storage and networking outfits, most likely, says Sacconaghi. Companies like Perot Systems (PER), Salesforce.com (CRM), Compellant (CML) and 3Com (COMS).

“We see Dell potentially looking to acquire a smaller remote infrastructure management company, or a smaller outsourcer–Perot fits the latter description, and is possible, but it is unclear that it is a willing seller, and its unique concentration (50 percent) in healthcare may be too narrow a platform for Dell’s offerings,” the analyst writes.

“…Dell’s software acquisitions to date have largely centered around systems management and we believe that similar types of companies could be acquired to further expand Dell’s capabilities. Also in software, we believe that [Salesforce.com] would be strategically consistent with Dell’s efforts to drive business at mid to large enterprises, but would be expensive ($4.8B current market cap) and would have a limited impact on revenues ($1.1B in their last FY)….

“Given that Dell’s biggest enterprise partnership is in storage, we believe the company could look to acquire additional IP for its own use. Compellent and CommVault (CVLT) could be appropriate targets. We think a networking deal is less likely, but purchasing someone such as 3COM and attempting to commoditize the networking space would not be inconsistent with Dell’s stated enterprise strategy.”

An interesting list of targets. Still, you’ve got to wonder why it doesn’t include Palm (PALM). After all, Dell really can’t afford to miss out on the handheld market completely. Can it?

With the AT&T (T) iPhone exclusivity deal set to expire in mid-2010, Apple (AAPL) has a big decision to make: extend that deal, or abandon it and sign on Verizon (VZ) as a second carrier partner.

In a note to clients today, Bernstein Research analyst Toni Sacconaghi considers the implications of both choices and concludes that the latter is the best option for Apple. Why? A deal with Verizon could more than double U.S. iPhone sales in the near term.

“Verizon’s postpaid subscriber base is not only larger than AT&T’s, but more importantly, is untapped whereas we estimate more than 10 percent of AT&T’s postpaid users already have an iPhone,” Sacconaghi explains. “Since the iPhone first launched in June 2007, AT&T has reported activating 2.6M units of the first-generation iPhone and 5.9M of the iPhone 3G, for a total of 8.5M units through the end of March 2009. This represents 14 percent of AT&T’s total postpaid subscriber base of 61M; assuming 1.5M iPhones have already been retired (despite the fact that even the very first iPhone buyer is still on his/her two-year service contract), we estimate 11-12 percent of AT&T’s postpaid base currently uses an iPhone. Within AT&T’s smartphone user base, we estimate the iPhone’s penetration is around 35 percent (given 32 percent of AT&T’s postpaid subscribers use smart phones–as confirmed by CEO Randall Stephenson). This suggests Apple has increasingly limited opportunity to attract new iPhone users within AT&T’s base; and if Apple maintains exclusivity with AT&T, iPhone sales will increasingly be driven by replacement sales, making it critical for Apple to introduce compelling new models.”

An attractive scenario for Apple, although–as Sacconaghi suggests–it does have its downside. Were Apple to refuse to extend AT&T’s iPhone exclusivity, the carrier would almost certainly reduce the subsidy it currently pays on the device. Untethered from AT&T, the iPhone would no longer be the powerful subscriber retention tool it once was. Sacconaghi figures that might inspire AT&T to crop the subsidy it pays on the device from an estimated $450 to around $250 to $350. If that were to happen, Apple might be forced to modestly raise the iPhone’s retail price, perhaps to $249, and take hit on margins.

Of course, might is the operative word here, because given the iPhone’s tremendous impact on AT&T’s wireless business, the last thing the company wants to do is annoy Apple. And really, what room does AT&T have to negotiate here? It’s not like it can suddenly stop selling and supporting the iPhone…

Over at Kaufman Bros., analyst Shaw Wu is betting on new iMacs as well as a sneak preview of Mac OS X 10.6 Leopard. “Our sense is that investor expectations [for Macworld] are fairly modest since it was announced that CEO Steve Jobs wouldn’t be the keynote speaker,” he wrote in a recent research note. “Nonetheless, we view new Macs as a positive catalyst as Apple’s desktop business (iMac, Mac mini, Mac Pro) needs a refresh to re-ignite sales.”

“There will not be any revolutionary products at this year’s event,” writes Piper Jaffray analyst Gene Munster, who anticipates the announcement of an updated iMac, possibly a redesigned Mac mini and little else.

Analyst Ben Reitzes of Barclays Capital expects a new iMac to the big announcement in an otherwise “neutral event.”

Bernstein Research analyst Toni Sacconaghi has similarly low expectations. “We expect MacWorld to be relatively unexciting, with the major highlights likely to be (1) a demonstration of Mac OSX 10.6 “SnowLeopard,” (2) new Mac desktops (iMac, MacMini) incorporating the same Nvidia chipset in the new MacBooks, and (3) a modest update to the AppleTV,” he writes. “A new iPhone is unlikely, in our view, though we do expect Apple to introduce a lower-end iPhone model within the first half of the year. Apple announced three weeks ago that this will be its last appearance at MacWorld, and that CEO Steve Jobs will not deliver the keynote this year. Given this, and a relative lack of new product rumors, we do not expect any big surprise announcements at MacWorld.”

The short, and obvious, answer to that question is “a hell of a lot.” In a note to clients today, Bernstein Research analyst Toni Sacconaghi argues that Wal-Mart (WMT) can sell between 800,000 and 1.3 million iPhones in 2009, though the retailer’s low price mantra may appear inconsistent with the iPhone’s market positioning. And that would seem to be a reasonable estimate. After all, Wal-Mart has some 2,500 retail outlets in the states, through which 100 million customers stream each week.

“The addition of Wal-Mart will roughly double the iPhone’s distribution in the US to nearly 6,000 outlets,” Sacconaghi writes. “We believe iPhone sales will benefit from the added distribution, though not proportionately; in our view, price (for both the device and service plan) is still the biggest hurdle to mass adoption…. With the iPhone already available at 3,000 Apple, AT&T (T), and Best Buy (BBY) stores, Wal-Mart likely does little to expand the device’s geographic reach. However, we believe Wal-Mart will have a greater impact on the iPhone’s demographic reach in terms of raising awareness and availability among lower-end consumers who are less likely to shop at the Apple Stores or BestBuy.”

One last point worth noting here, Sacconaghi puts little faith in rumors that Wal-Mart will offer a $99 4GB iPhone. “Could there be a cheaper iPhone at Wal-Mart,” he writes. “We think it unlikely, at least initially, but the idea is not completely unfounded. In our view, a $99 price point for the iPhone seems too low, but some modest discount is not implausible.”

Shares in the company slid still deeper into the mud today as the market reflected on the uneventful conclusion of the company’s merger talks with Microsoft (MSFT) and its decision to–well, let’s face it–become a reseller of Google (GOOG) ads. In early trading, Yahoo’s stock, which plummeted 10% in late trading yesterday, fell another 6% to around $22. And it’s likely to fall further still, with financial analysts taking swings at it like kids at a piñata.

“This deal diminishes Yahoo’s relevance among advertisers and strengthens the hand of a key competitor,” analyst Mark May of Needham & Company told clients in a research note today.

And over at Cantor Fitzgerald, analyst Derek Brown agreed. “We remain concerned about the long-term implications of this deal for Yahoo,” he said. “While the company should reap a near-term financial windfall with Google by its side, it seems to be sacrificing its vision of becoming a ‘must buy’ for online advertisers. After all, doesn’t this deal make Google, not Yahoo!, the ‘must buy’ for online advertisers?”

Jeffrey Lindsay of Bernstein Research says the deal is a litigation nightmare waiting to happen. “We think at a minimum that the current deal will result in further lawsuits, which Yahoo will ultimately have to settle, further impacting the economics of the deal,” he said.

And analyst Laura Martin of Soleil Securities Group says it’s just a nightmare, plain and simple. “Execution issues become more challenging as talent continues to stream out the door,” Martin said in a research note. “With the collapse of the Microsoft deal, Yahoo employees lost (in addition to shareholders), and we expect Yahoo’s employee turnover to accelerate as its share price falls and their stock options are way underwater. Shareholder litigation may distract the board and senior management and will cost Yahoo shareholders more money.”

And Shar VanBoskirk, an analyst with Forrester Research (FORR), well, she reacted as I imagine many observers did–with a slow shake of the head. “It’s a great deal for Google,” she told BusinessWeek . “I have no idea what Yahoo’s thinking.”

If it was thinking at all … Said Mark May, an analyst at Needham & Co., “This just reaffirms the view that Yahoo, and particularly Jerry Yang and David Filo, blew it. It’s hard to see how this management team is going to be able to extract or create value anywhere near 33 bucks a share anytime soon.”